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FROM NUREMBERG TO DAYTON AND
BEYOND: THE STRUGGLE FOR
PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN BOSNIA
John Shattuck*

I.

CURRENT SOLUInONS TO POST-COLD WAR CONFLICTs

Bosnia is a landmark human rights catastrophe. At long last,
after three years of genocidal warfare, the current effort to resolve
the Bosnia conflict has involved an unprecedented combination of
military force, aggressive diplomacy and humanitarian law - all
deployed in a highly unstable post-Cold War strategic environment.
The stakes for the success of this effort are high.
The Cold War had prepared the international community to
meet a different type of conflict, the kind it faced in Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait - a clear-cut cross-border invasion by a foreign aggressor. Bosnia, by contrast, confronted the world with a war that
Europe had not thought it would see again: a genocidal, ethnic-religious conflict, generating massive atrocities against civilians, creating millions of refugees and displaced persons within a formerly
unified nation, all among a welter of cross-cutting-population
groups.
THE DAYTON ACCORDS

Clearly, it is too early to pass judgment on the success of the
current international effort in Bosnia.
* Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1993-1998;
United States Ambassador to the Czech Republic, since November 1998. B.A. Yale College;
M.A. Cambridge University; L.L.B. Yale Law School. This paper was the Keynote Address
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We are at the beginning stages of implementing the diplomatic
product of this effort, the Dayton Accords, and many important
challenges are still pending or yet unforeseen. We face the daunting prospect of facilitating free and fair elections, removing war
criminals from positions of political influence and bringing them to
justice, assisting with the exchange of prisoners, securing an environment for freedom of movement and the return of refugees and
establishing national and local institutions of justice and human
rights protection. Nevertheless, major elements of the Dayton
Accords have already been successfully implemented, including an
agreement to a permanent cease-fire, the deployment of an International Force (IFOR), the release of many prisoners, and the establishment of the transitional institutions of justice to indict and bring
to trial suspected war criminals.
Looking beyond the immediate challenges of implementation,
Dayton stands as an important breakthrough in modem diplomacy
for its integration of policies that promote justice and respect for
human rights with the effort to bring peace to the region. If they
succeed, the Dayton Accords may come to serve as a model for
ending future conflicts. If they fail, the related objectives of conflict
prevention and justice promotion will be severely set back.
Two elements of the Dayton Accords are unprecedented in
recent history. First, they place human rights in the main fabric of
Bosnia's diplomacy, acknowledging that violations of humanitarian
law are central to both the origins and solutions of the conflict. Second, the Dayton Accords firmly establish the reach of institutions
of transitional justice and accountability in structuring the Bosnian
peace. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (War Crimes Tribunal) was required as an
important indication of compliance with the Dayton Accords.
INSTITUTIONS FOR STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE POST-COLD

WAR PERIOD

The unfolding drama in Bosnia is, of course, inseparable from
its place in the historical development of the post-Cold War world.

As we enter this era, we would do well to recall its beginnings half a
century ago.
At the close of World War II, the Allies set about to create
institutions of governance, security, prosperity and justice that
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would in turn institutionalize their military victories over fascism
and lay the foundation for future stability and peace.
Three out of those four projects have achieved a large measure
of enduring success. On the governance front, the United Nations,
despite its many well-documented shortcomings, has created a
framework for dialogue and cooperation among extraordinarily
diverse members of the international community and has led the
way on such global issues as health, the environment, and refugees.
On the security front, NATO has withstood the challenges of
decades to emerge as the most successful alliance in modern history, effectively bringing about victory in the Cold War without
having had to engage in major military conflicts. The new missions
that NATO is undertaking today build on that experience in facing
new challenges.
On the economic front, the Bretton Woods institutions have
created a framework in and through which an open, liberalized economic order is taking root all over the world. This in turn has
brought prosperity and stability to many countries, and is now
being expanded to address issues of poverty and economic instability in the developing world. These institutions are also undergoing
modifications to meet new challenges, such as the development of
Eastern Europe, and new concerns, such as the degradation of the
global environment.
When we turn to the fourth element of the post-war vision of
institutions of justice, the picture is far less clear. At the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Allies laid the foundation for a new international
order in which institutions of justice would hold leaders accountable for genocide and crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg trials and to a lesser extent the Tokyo Trials succeeded in
demonstrating to weary Allied publics just what had been at stake
in the struggle against fascism and in educating future generations
about what had happened and why it must never be repeated.
Since Nuremberg, the creation of institutions of international
justice have proceeded with difficulty. The deep political divisions
of the Cold War made it impossible to build credible international
institutions of impartial justice. The gridlock of the U.N. Security
Council caused by the veto power of its permanent members precluded any serious efforts to create a criminal tribunal. Meanwhile,
many human rights and democracy advocates saw a dichotomy
between justice and reconciliation, and felt compelled to choose

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 3:27

between the two in situations where formerly authoritarian regimes
were making transitions to democracy. This dilemma was posed
most sharply in Latin America, but it has also been seen in Eastern
Europe and South Africa.
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT

With the end of the Cold War, we must take a fresh look at
international justice and its role in ending conflict. Our world,
despite its often overwhelming new problems and sources of instability, is no longer cleft into two opposing ideological and geopolitical camps; this in turn creates new opportunities for overcoming the
constraints that have hobbled transitional institutions of justice for
decades. In recent years we have witnessed human rights catastrophes in Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Central Asia and elsewhere that
have been characterized by the recurrent nightmare of our time:
systematic attacks on civilians based on their ethnic and religious
identities, resulting in mass atrocities and sometimes genocide. In
these conflicts, ethnic and religious differences have been cynically
exploited by political elites and their leaders to advance their own
interests. Despite varying circumstances of time and place, these
vicious wars all have a common theme: they are directed primarily
against civilians who have no defense other than the principles of
international humanitarian law. And that defense, of course, is
worthless unless there is political will to enforce it.
HuMAN

RIGHTS LESSONS LEARNED

During the past five years we have learned some lessons from
the violence and human rights atrocities that have prevented peace
in Bosnia and elsewhere. Chief among those lessons is that justice
and peace can, and in many cases must, be pursued simultaneously.
Indeed, accounting for human rights abuses through national or
international "Truth Commissions" has proven to be an integral
part of recent peace processes in such diverse countries as South
Africa, El Salvador, Cambodia, Guatemala, Haiti, Chile, and
Argentina.
This growing international experience with human rights
accountability was incorporated into the U.S.-led peace efforts in
Bosnia that were initiated in August 1995. The U.S. strategy went
beyond the narrow territorial focus of earlier, unsuccessful Balkan
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peace efforts and accorded human rights issues a significant role in
the strategy to end the conflict.
During the spring of 1995, the failure of traditional peacekeeping in Bosnia, which had long been questioned, became increasingly
evident. The tide was turned by changes on the ground: the U.S
campaign to strengthen U.N rules of engagement, the Croat-Muslim offensives to push back the Serbs and, more than anything, the
fall of the U.N. safehavens of Srebrenica and Zepa in July, which
indelibly showed the terrible human consequences of failed
peacekeeping.
Reports of the worst atrocities and mass executions of the war,
conveyed by a number of witnesses and observers, galvanized the
international community to take the military actions it had been
unwilling to consider earlier. At the London Conference in July,
the United States led the effort to achieve international agreement
for releasing NATO from the debilitating "dual key," by which
U.N. civilian officials could veto military commanders. This decision cleared the way for three weeks of NATO bombing in response
to new Serb aggression and atrocities against civilians in August and
September, 1995.
THE

EMERGENCE OF A

NEW

PEACE STRATEGY

In mid-August, President Clinton launched a major military
and diplomatic effort to start a new peace process, "diplomacy
backed by force," spearheaded by my colleague Assistant Secretary
of State Richard Holbrooke. As Holbrooke began his shuttle
diplomacy to Balkan capitals, I was dispatched by Secretary of State
Warren Christopher on a series of human rights missions in the
areas of confrontation on the ground in Bosnia and Croatia. Our
new peace strategy involved close coordination between negotiations with regional leaders and real-time investigations of human
rights atrocities.
Four central elements of this strategy involved: spotlighting
atrocities against civilians the moment they occurred; securing
immediate commitments from leaders to end atrocities or face military consequences in the form of NATO bombing; supporting and
moving the new War Crimes Tribunal to center stage as a way of
raising the personal costs of criminal leadership; and refusing to
negotiate with indicted war criminals, and in the process isolating
the main opponents of peace.
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Growing pressure on the warring parties generated by this
strategy led to a latticework of understandings and working
arrangements that propelled the entire peace process forward. Over
a period of ten months, a series of human rights missions and war
crimes investigations fundamentally shaped the course of
peacemaking:
In Tuzla - U.S. interviews with survivors of the mass
executions of Muslims in Srebrenica made clear the
importance of isolating Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, both of whom
were personally implicated in the atrocities.
August:
In Krajina - Croat atrocities committed against Serb
civilians were exposed by U.S. and U.N. missions to
the area.
September: In Zenica - A new round of vicious ethnic cleansing
and Serb paramilitary actions against Muslim civilians
around Banja Luka were exposed by U.S. investigations, the results of which were immediately brought
by U.S. negotiators to the attention of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.
October:
In Banja Luka - The first international mission, conducted by U.S. officials, crossed the confrontation line
to demonstrate the importance of freedom of movement. Milosevic agreed to provide security assistance
to the mission, as the peace negotiations scheduled in
Dayton for November 1 to 21 drew near.
November: In Sanski Most - The first prisoners of war were
released, indicating a major confidence-building step
for Bosnians and reinforcing the cease-fire.
January:
In Srebrenica - U.S. officials gathered evidence corroborating the previous statements of eyewitness
accounts by survivors of mass executions in July. War
Crimes Tribunal investigators secured access to sites
of alleged war crimes.
In Omarska, Lubija - NATO troops provided security
protection for visits by U.S. officials to sites of major
atrocities.
In Sarajevo, Pale, Mostar - Under heavy international
pressure, all parties released additional prisoners.
July:
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February:

March:

In Sarajevo and in the War Crimes Tribunal - U.S.
officials arranged IFOR transportation of suspected
war criminals to the War Crimes Tribunal in the
Hague. The parties adopted "rules of the road" which
prevent the round-ups of civilians under pretext of
charges of war crimes.
In Belgrade - U.S. and Tribunal officials arranged for
Bosnian Serb war crimes suspects in Serbia to be
transported to the Hague. In Zagreb - Indicted Croat
General Tihomir Blaskic surrendered under U.S.
pressure and was transported to the Hague.

These events illustrate how the road map devised in Dayton
was oriented, in part, on the exposure of violations through factgathering and the assignment of responsibility by human rights missions and the work of the War Crimes Tribunal. From the start, the
United States was the main backer of the Tribunal. As the peace
process moved ahead, the practical utility of this new institution of
justice became even more clear. In the months leading up to Dayton, and currently, the Tribunal has remained essential to implementing the peace agreement on the ground.
CRITICAL ROLE OF THE HAGUE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

There are several closely related reasons why the Hague War
Crimes Tribunal has proven essential to the peace process:
- The War Crimes Tribunal has a role in isolating opponents of
the process by undercutting the legitimacy of indicted war
criminals. The confrontation between the international community and the two leading Bosnian Serb indicted war
criminals, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, illustrates
the War Crimes Tribunal's role in discrediting peace
opponents.
- The War Crimes Tribunal can create breathing room for
moderates to emerge. The removal of Karadzic from offfice
has opened the way for moderates from Banja Luka and
elsewhere in Srpska to compete successfully in national and
municipal elections.
- The War Crimes Tribunal can deter new war crimes by publicizing indictments, and can contribute to breaking the cycles
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of violence by beginning to answer the demand for justice by
victims who would otherwise seek retribution.
- The War Crimes Tribunal can turn indicted war criminals
into international pariahs, making it more difficult for them
to seek support abroad. This has already happened to
Karadzic and Mladic, as well as lesser known figures in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, all of whom must eventually be
brought to justice.
Looking beyond the immediate issues in Bosnia, several elements of lasting significance emerge from the War Crimes Tribunal's work. We are witnessing, for the first time in history, war
crimes prosecutions in "real time," when peace is not yet permanently secured, when there are no victors, and when no unconditional surrender has been offered. This is justice not for one party
only, but for multiple parties, as a crucial element of peacemaking,
and not as a by-product of peace. Both the Bosnia and Rwanda
War Crimes Tribunals have raised the personal cost of criminal conduct by leaders. In so doing, they provide conflict-torn societies
with the possibility of moving beyond horrific communal violence
by beginning to hold individuals accountable for their crimes.
Additionally, the War Crimes Tribunals demonstrate that
neither international law nor political power can ultimately shield
violations of humanitarian law, and that it is possible to create transitional institutions of justice. This does not mean, as is sometimes
suggested by both critics and supporters, that state sovereignty is a
thing of the past. For example, it is still up to state parties to extradite suspects to the War Crimes Tribunal. But the entity to which
they are extraditing them is not another state, but rather an institution whose political and moral force derives from its transitional
legitimacy and its power to enforce international humanitarian law.
In short, the international community is beginning to create the
rudimentary means of enforcing basic humanitarian standards of
behavior. Government leaders will know that henceforth they can
be called to account -

and sometimes even prosecuted -

for

genocide and crimes against humanity before the bar of international justice. The very fact that sovereign nations have passed legislation to implement the War Crimes Tribunal's mandate is
evidence that transitional legal institutions can be constructed with
meaningful reach, where there is the political will to do so.
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The success of the War Crimes Tribunals will not only give
peace a chance in Bosnia and Rwanda. It will also create significant
precedents for the future of international justice and the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.
The ideas animating this historic enterprise were succinctly
summarized by President Clinton in a speech delivered on October
15, 1995, marking the fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the
Nuremberg Trials:
No peace will endure for long without justice. For only justice
can break finally the cycle of violence and retribution that fuels
crimes against humanity. Only justice can lift the burden of collective guilt that weighs upon a society where unspeakable acts of
destruction have occurred. By prosecuting war criminals in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda we can send a strong signal to those who
commit such 1 terrible atrocities that they cannot escape the
consequences.
Moral leadership should be at the heart of foreign policy. The
experience of Bosnia has shown that, taken together, both moral
and practical leadership can create a powerful and compelling
formula for addressing international human rights catastrophes.

1. President Bill Clinton, Speech at the University of Connecticut, A Commitment to
Human Dignity, Democracy and Peace (May 1996).

